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- From: wnewman@netcom.com (Bill Newman)
- Subject: Re: C/C++ knocks the crap out of Ada
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- Date: Tue, 27 Feb 1996 20:48:19 GMT
- Sender: wnewman@netcom3.netcom.com
-
- Robert Dewar (dewar@cs.nyu.edu) wrote:
- : "For the record, it was NASA administrators who pushed for the
- : Challenger launch. The engineers and contractors were overruled in
- : their efforts to scrub the launch."
-
- : Are you sure of this, it certainly does not correspond to published news
- : accounts and public statements at the time. I am questioning the part of
- : your statement that says "contractors", rather than "engineers".
-
- : Are you really saying that everyone at all levels in the contractor's
- : organization recommended against the launch and NASA overruled? This
- : would be a rather remarkable situation, and, as I say was not what
- : was in the news at the time -- which instead indicated a much more
- : muddled picture, in which some engineers were concerned, but there
- : was controversy at all levels as to how significant this concern was.
-
- I have a copy of the Presidential Commission report here (I was an
- undergrad at Caltech at the time, and took enough of an interest to
- get a copy), and I've entered a couple of pages of their summary
- below. The typeset formatting doesn't translate very well to 80
- columns, so I've done a little rearranging, but the gist is there.
-
- Basically, NASA pushed Thiokol to approve the launch, and Thiokol
- did. Ah, memories. I remember being pretty dismayed by the whole
- affair and its aftermath. These days, when a press conference
- of handwriting experts declaring the Foster
- nothing-there-oops-what-are-these-twenty-seven-scraps-of-paper
- suicide note as a forgery can hit the newswire and then disappear
- without a trace, it's hard to get too upset about a fiasco when
- it was at least followed by a relatively credible investigation.
- One gains perspective with age, perhaps. (I still would have
- preferred someone other than Thiokol to get the contract to build
- new SRM's, though..)
-
- Bill Newman
- wnewman@netcom.com
-
- From the Chronology on pp. 107-109 of the _Report of the Presidential
- Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident_:
-
- Approximately 8:45 (EST) [Jan 27, 1986, I think -- WHN]
- At Morton Thiokol, Utah
- (1) Jerald Mason, Senior VP, Wasatch Operations;
- (2) Calvin Wiggins, VP and General Manager, Space Division, Wasatch;
- (3) Joe C. Kilminster, VP, Space Booster Programs, Wasatch;
- (4) Robert K. Lund, VP, Engineering;
- (5) Roger Boisjoly, Member Seal Task Force;
- (6) Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, Rocket Motor Cases.
- At Kennedy Space Flight Center
- (1) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC;
- (2) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB Project, MSFC;
- (3) Allan J. McDonald, Director, SRM Project, MTI.
- At Marshall Space Flight Center
- (1) George B. Hardy, Deputy Director, Science and Engineering;
- (2) Judson A. Lovingood, Deputy Manager, Shuttle Project Office;
- (3) Ben Powers, Engineering Structures and Propulsion.
- plus other personnel (see table page 111) [which I've skipped -- WHN]
- * Second Teleconference. Charts present a history of the O-Ring
- erosion and blow-by for the primary seal in the field joints,
- including results of subscale tests, previous flights, and static
- tests of Solid Rocket Motors.
- * The data shows that the timing function of the O-rings will be
- slower due to lower temperatures and that the worst blow-by occurred
- on SRM 15 (STS 51-C) in January, 1985 with O-ring temperatures
- of 53 degrees Fahrenheit.
- * Recommendation by Thiokol (Lund) is not to fly STS 51-L (SRM-25)
- until the temperature of the O-ring reached 53 degrees Fahrenheit,
- which was the lowest temperature of any previous flight.
- * Mulloy asks for recommendation from Kilminster.
- * Kilminster states that based upon the engineering recommendation,
- he can *not* recommend launch.
- * Hardy is reported by both McDonald and Boisjoly to have said he is
- ``appalled'' by Thiokol's recommendation.
- * Reinartz comments that he is under the impression that SRM is
- qualified from 40 degrees Fahrenheit to 90 degrees Fahrenheit.
- * NASA personnel challenge conclusions and recomendations.
- * Kilminster asks for five minutes off-net to caucus.
-
- Approximately 10:30 PM (EST)
- Thiokol personnel
- (1) Jerald Mason, Senior VP, Wasatch Operations;
- (2) Joe C. Kilminster, VP, Space Booster Program;
- (3) Calvin Wiggins, VP and General Manager, Space Division;
- (4) Robert K. Lund, VP, Engineering;
- (5) Arnold R. Thompson, Supervisor, Rocket Motor Cases;
- (6) Roger Boisjoly, Member, Seal Task Force;
- (7) Brian Russel, Special Projects, SRM Program Office;
- (8) Robert Ebeling, Manager, Ignition System and Final Assembly,
- SRM Project.
- plus other personnel
- * Thiokol Caucus. Caucus continues for about 30 minutes at Thiokol,
- Wasatch, Utah.
- * Major issues are (1) temperature effects on O-ring, and (2) erosion
- of the O-ring.
- * Thompson and Boisjoly voice objections to launch and indication
- is that Lund is also reluctant to launch.
- * A final management review is conducted with only Mason, Lund,
- Kilminster, and Wiggins.
- * Lund is asked to put on management hat by Mason.
- * Final agreement is: (1) there is a substantial margin to
- erode the primary O-ring by a factor of three times the
- previous worst case, and (2) even if the primary O-ring does not
- seal, the secondary is in position and will.
-
- Approximately 10:30 PM to 11:00 PM (EST)
- At Kennedy Space Center
- (1) Allan J. McDonald, Manager, Space Booster Project, Morton Thiokol,
- Inc. (MTI);
- (2) Lawrence B. Mulloy, Manager, SRB Projects, MSFC;
- (3) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Projects, MSFC;
- (4) Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC Operations, for MTI;
- (5) Cecil Houston, MSFC Resident Manager, at KSC.
- * Conversation at Kennedy. McDonald continues to argue for delay.
- * McDonald challenges Reinartz's rationale that SRM is qualified at
- 40 degrees F. to 90 degrees F., and Mulloy's explanation that
- Propellant Mean Bulk Temperatures are within specifications.
-
- Approximately 11:00 PM (EST)
- Same participants as 8:45 PM Teleconference
- * Second Teleconference (cont'd). Thiokol indicates it had reassessed;
- temperature effects are concern, but data is inconclusive.
- * Kilminster reads the rationale for recommending launch.
- * Thiokol recommends launch.
- * Hardy requests that Thiokol put in writing their recommendation
- and send it by fax to both Kennedy and Marshall.
-
- Approximately 11:15 to 11:30 PM (EST)
- At Kennedy Space Center
- (1) Allan J. McDonald, Manager, Space Booster Project, MTI;
- (2) Lawrence Mulloy, Manager, SRB Projects Office, MSFC;
- (3) Stanley R. Reinartz, Manager, Shuttle Projects Office, MSFC;
- (4) Jack Buchanan, Manager, KSC Operations, for MTI;
- (5) Cecil Houston, Manager, MSFC Resident Office at KSC.
- * Conversation at Kennedy. McDonald argues again for delay
- asking how NASA could rationalize launching below qualification
- temperature.
- * McDonald indicates that if anything happened, he would not
- want to have to explain to Board of Inquiry.
- * McDonald indicates that he would cancel launch since (1) O-Ring
- problem at low temperatures; (2) booster recovery ships heading
- into wind toward shore due to high seas, and (3) icing
- conditions on launch pad.
- * McDonald is told it is not his concern and that his above
- concerns will be passed on in advisory capacity.
-
- Approximately 11:45 PM (EST)
- * Kilminster faxes Thiokol's recommendation to launch at 9:45
- MST, 27 January 1986 (11:45 EST).
- * Fax is signed by Kilminster.
- * McDonald retrieves fax at KSC.
-
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